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Most of the recent literature on the effects of the brain drain on source countries consists of 
theoretical  papers  and  cross-country  empirical  studies.  In  this  paper  we  complement  the 
literature through three case studies on very different regional and professional contexts: the 
African medical brain drain, the exodus of European researchers to the United States, and the 
contribution of the Indian diaspora to the rise of the IT sector in India. While the three case 
studies concern the very upper tail of the skill and education distribution, their effects of 
source  countries  are  contrasted:  clearly  negative  in  the  case  of  the  exodus  of  European 
researchers, clearly positive in the case of the Indian diaspora’s contribution to putting India 
on the IT global map, and mixed in the case of the medical brain drain out of Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
Most of the recent literature on the effects of the brain drain on source countries consists of 
theoretical  papers  (e.g.,  Mountford,  1997,  Vidal,  1998,  Beine  et  al.,  2001)  and  of  cross-
country empirical studies on the “brain gain” (Beine et al., 2008) and the diaspora networks 
channels  (Kerr,  2008,  Agrawal  et  al.,  2008,  Kugler  and  Rapoport,  2007,  Docquier  and 
Lodigiani, 2009).  The main novelty of  the  recent literature  is to  show that  under certain 
circumstances,  the  brain  drain  may  ultimately  prove  beneficial  (but  of  course  is  not 
necessarily so) to the source country, and to do so while at the same time accounting for the 
various  fiscal,  technological  and  Lucas-type  externalities  that  were  at  the  heart  of  the 
pessimistic  models  of  the  1970s.  Another  novelty  is  that  it  is evidence-based,  something 
which was out of reach until not long ago due to the lack of decent comparative data on 
international migration by educational attainment.
2 
By  nature,  theoretical  models  and  cross-country  comparisons  cannot  account  for  the 
intricacies and details which are context specific. They have also abstracted (so far) from 
accounting for the huge heterogeneity among skilled workers, aggregating flows of workers 
with intermediate skills (e.g., less than 4 years of college education) and high skills (e.g., PhD 
holders). In this paper we complement the recent literature in that we focus on “the cream of 
the cream”, that is, the upper tail of the skill and education distribution. We first present 
general data  on the  international  migration  of very  highly  educated individuals, and then 
investigate in more details three very different regional and professional contexts: the African 
medical brain drain, the exodus of European researchers (mainly to the United States), and the 
contribution of the Indian diaspora to the rise of the IT sector in India. 
 
2. Data: the brain drain at the upper tail of the education distribution 
2.1. General figures 
International  migration  of  highly-skilled  professionals  (or  brain  drain)  has  increased 
tremendously over the last few decades, at about the same pace as trade, and has recently 
increased even more rapidly (by 70 percent during the 1990s only).
3 By 2000, there were sixty 
million highly-skilled (tertiary educated) immigrants in the OECD area, or about one third of 
                                                
2 See Docquier and Rapoport (2009) for a broad survey of this literature. 
3 The total number of highly educated immigrants living in the OECD member countries has increased by 70 
percent during the 1990s (and has doubled for those originating from developing countries) against just a 30 
percent increase for unskilled immigrants.   3 
total  immigration.  These  highly  skilled  immigrants  represent  a  tiny  three  percent  of  the 
European  skilled  workforce  against  more  than  ten  percent  of  the  skilled  labor  force  in 
countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia. Given that the vast majority of 
these immigrants come from developing countries where human capital is very scarce, it often 
represents  a  significant  loss  of  human  capital  for  source  countries.  And  indeed,  some 
developing countries exhibit brain drain rates frequently higher than fifty percent (which is 
typically the case for Sub-Saharan African countries) or even eighty percent (in countries such 
as Jamaica and Guyana) (Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk, 2009).
4 
However, general emigration rates may hide heterogeneity across sectors and occupations. If 
emigration is concentrated in certain fields and the domestic supply of these skills is inelastic, 
then  emigration  can  induce  occupational  shortages  that  may  be  particularly  harmful  for 
economic development. In this paper, we focus of the upper tail of the skill and education 
distribution:  PhD  holders,  researchers  in  Science  and  Technology,  medical  doctors, 
information technology specialists. These professions are crucial for the R&D sector and for 
technological innovation (in the case of already advanced countries) and adoption (which is 
more  relevant  for  developing  countries),  not  be  mention  the  fact  that  health  care  is  a 
complement to human capital, implying that the quantity and quality of the medical staff 
strongly conditions the productivity of all other professions (Kremer, 1993). Before turning to 
our three case studies, we first present more focused data on PhD holders and researchers in 
science and technology, on the one hand, and on the medical brain drain, on the other hand. 
 
                                                
4 See Figure 1.   4
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2.2. PhD holders and researchers in Science and Technology 
Table 1 focuses on the emigration of PhD graduates. For 82 origin countries, we provide (i) 
the numbers of PhD graduates working in the US, (ii) the shares of these PhDs among US 
post-secondary educated immigrants by country of origin, (iii) the ratio of PhD holders living 
in the US to the estimated number of PhD holders trained in their country (an estimate of the 
emigration rate to the US of PhD holders by country of origin). To compute (i) and (ii), we 
use the SESTAT database of the National Science  Foundation. To calculate  (iii), we use 
UNESCO  data  on  the  flow  of  PhD  graduates  trained  at  origin  (average  2002-2004)  and 
assume that the flows of new PhD graduates represent 5 percent of the stock in developing 
countries and 4 in developed countries. The estimated emigration rate is obtained by dividing 
the stock living in the US by the estimated stock domestically trained. 
The highest numbers of foreign PhD holders are obtained for developed countries and large 
developing countries such as China, Russia, Iran, Nigeria, Egypt. As a proportion of tertiary 
graduates living in the US, the proportion of PhD is extremely high in the cases of Slovenia, 
Cameroon, Georgia and Tunisia. The last columns indicates that the estimated emigration rate 
of PhD holders is high for Latin American countries and some African countries. 
Regarding the capacity to innovate, it is also interesting to focus on researchers employed in 
S&T. This includes many PhD holders but also many other college graduates employed in this 
sector. Table 2 compares migration of researchers employed in the US R&D sector (using the 
SESTAT database) to UNESCO data on researchers nationally employed in S&T. We will 
provide researchers’ emigration numbers and rates to the US for 70 countries, including 39 
developing  states.  The  average  emigration  rates  of  developing  countries  (45.6  percent) 
exceeds that of developed countries (21.4 percent). The rate is particularly high (above 80 
percent) in the cases of Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama or 
Vietnam. 
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Table 1. Top-30 suppliers PhD’s to the US 
PhD graduates in the US  Share in graduates in the US  Estimated mig. rate to the US 
China   63153  Slovenia   71,4%  Panama   93,2% 
United Kingdom  24482  Cameroon   51,7%  Ethiopia   91,3% 
Canada   19122  Georgia   46,1%  Colombia   84,4% 
Germany  17840  Tunisia   31,8%  Honduras   78,5% 
Russia   12835  Saudi Arabia   26,8%  Iceland   72,9% 
South Korea   12172  Iceland   21,5%  Uruguay   71,8% 
Iran   8996  China   21,3%  Tanzania   65,8% 
France   7277  Estonia   19,6%  Cyprus   49,2% 
Poland   6488  Uzbekistan   19,6%  Macao   49,1% 
Japan   6478  Azerbaijan   19,6%  Trinidad and Tobago   47,2% 
Mexico   5693  Switzerland   18,1%  Argentina   37,0% 
Nigeria   4862  Croatia   18,1%  Cuba   30,7% 
Egypt   4725  Finland   17,8%  Cameroon   23,7% 
Israel   4694  Czech Republic  17,6%  China   22,8% 
Argentina   4405  Slovakia  17,6%  Cambodia   22,7% 
Romania   4122  Austria   17,4%  Bangladesh   21,7% 
Italy   3997  Israel   16,5%  Ghana   16,6% 
Brazil   3952  Hungary   16,3%  Ireland   16,0% 
Turkey   3798  Ghana   15,9%  Israel   15,9% 
Colombia   3787  Romania   15,8%  Canada   15,7% 
Cameroon   3714  Turkey   15,4%  Iran   15,1% 
Ukraine   3701  Russia   15,2%  Croatia   14,4% 
Philippines   3658  Ethiopia   12,5%  Jordan   14,4% 
Spain   3435  Spain   12,0%  Mexico   13,4% 
Ireland   3294  Argentina   12,0%  Armenia   12,8% 
Cuba   3246  Armenia   11,9%  Hungary   12,5% 
Greece   2948  France   11,6%  Bulgaria   11,7% 
Ghana   2909  Brazil   11,4%  Estonia   11,2% 
Hungary   2877  United Kingdom  11,3%  Lebanon   10,7% 
Australia   2477  Sweden   11,2%  Philippines   10,2% 
Sources: SESTAT-NSF and UNESCO. 
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Table 2. Researchers employed in Science and Technology in the US in 2003 























Algeria  1242  5678  17,9  Australia  4889  79919  5,8 
Bolivia  2214  1140  66,0  Austria  3815  26563  12,6 
Brazil  10980  79600  12,1  Belgium  4767  32229  12,9 
Bulgaria  4497  9400  32,4  Canada  72584  122809  37,1 
Myanmar  1727  732  70,2  Hong Kong  26602  12410  68,2 
Cambodia  3030  239  92,7  Cyprus  591  532  52,6 
Cameroon  3643  472  88,5  Czech Republic  2455  17232  12,5 
Chile  5496  10120  35,2  Denmark  2561  25035  9,3 
China  158524  907743  14,9  Estonia  813  3063  21,0 
Colombia  19362  4487  81,2  Finland  791  39897  1,9 
Costa Rica  4659  529  89,8  France  16072  195638  7,6 
Cote d'Ivoire  288  1292  18,2  Germany  59213  269703  18,0 
Croatia  1666  6722  19,9  Greece  6554  16546  28,4 
Ecuador  7012  595  92,2  Hungary  4986  15001  24,9 
Ethiopia  2549  1649  60,7  Iceland  1002  2034  33,0 
Guatemala  1415  398  78,1  Ireland  9270  10741  46,3 
Indonesia  5163  45567  10,2  Italy  15022  73181  17,0 
Kazakhstan  1108  10339  9,7  Japan  34757  677723  4,9 
Latvia  2728  3291  45,3  Kuwait  1118  202  84,7 
Lithuania  2285  7105  24,3  Luxembourg  100  2108  4,5 
Macedonia  80  1147  6,5  Netherlands  7616  41082  15,6 
Madagascar  166  887  15,8  New Zealand  3217  15911  16,8 
Malaysia  7955  10419  43,3  Norway  3291  21339  13,4 
Malta  452  359  55,7  Portugal  2581  20067  11,4 
Mexico  46356  42953  51,9  Singapore  3397  21821  13,5 
Nepal  1739  1627  51,7  Slovakia  1227  10008  10,9 
Pakistan  14682  12919  53,2  Slovenia  202  4455  4,3 
Panama  7498  307  96,1  South Korea  50605  154884  24,6 
Paraguay  335  489  40,6  Sweden  3585  50091  6,7 
Romania  10900  20761  34,4  Switzerland  3768  25616  12,8 
Russia  35588  478090  6,9  United Kingdom  72396  177625  29,0 
South Africa  5906  16248  26,7         
Sri Lanka  4652  2703  63,3         
Thailand  7781  18430  29,7         
Tunisia  2003  11805  14,5         
Turkey  8878  31587  21,9         
Uruguay  1625  1244  56,6         
Venezuela  8058  3537  69,5         
Vietnam  44236  9863  81,8             
Average        45,6  Average        21,4 
Sources: SESTAT-NSF and UNSECO 
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2.3. The medical brain drain 
In developing countries, the size and quality of the medical sector is a key determinant of 
human development and economic performances (see Bhargava et al., 2001, Hagopian et al., 
2004, Cooper, 2004, Bhargava and Docquier, 2008). While the number of physicians per 
1,000 people is greater than 3 in most industrialized countries, it is lower than 0.25 in many 
developing  countries  (see  Figure  2a).  Many  observers  and  analysts  have  pointed  to  the 
medical brain drain as one of the major factors leading to the under-provision of healthcare 
staff  in  developing  countries  (see  Bundred  and  Levitt,  2000,  or  Beeckam,  2002)  and, 
ultimately, to low health status and shorter life expectancy – hence Michael Clemens’s (2007) 
provocative question: do visas kill? 
Two data sets can be used to document the international migration of physicians: 
•  Clemens and Pettersson (2006) collect data on foreign physicians and nurses from 
nine important destination countries (UK, US, France, Australia, Canada, Portugal, 
Belgium, Spain and South Africa) and compute the stock of African-born physicians 
living abroad by country of birth in 2000. They then evaluate the medical brain drain 
in relative terms, dividing the number of physicians abroad by the total number of 
physicians born in each origin country. 
•  Docquier and Bhargava (2006) use the same methodology but collect data from 17 
countries (16 OECD countries and South Africa) and define migrants according to 
their country of training. Such data can be obtained from national medical associations 
and are available on an annual basis. They come up with 14 yearly observations per 
country covering all the countries of the world for the period 1991-2004. Regional 
comparisons reveal that the medical brain drain is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (with 
average rates above 20% against 13% in South-Asia and less than 10% in all the other 
regions); the figures are relatively stable over the period. 
Focusing  on  the  year  2000,  the  comparison  of  these  two  data  sets  reveals  important 
differences,  with  a  correlation  between  the  two  of  only  .23.  The  “bilateral”  correlations 
between physician immigrants stocks in the eight common destination countries are much 
higher (from 55 percent for South Africa to 97 percent for France and the United States). 
However, the stock based on country of training is usually much lower than the stock based   9 
on country of birth (e.g., 10% in France,
5 45% in South Africa, 77% in the United Kingdom, 
and 82% in the United States).  
Figure  2b  shows  the  geographical  distribution  of  the  medical  brain  drain  computed  in 
Docquier and Bhargava (2006). The average medical brain drain is particularly severe in Sub-
Saharan  Africa,  South  Asia,  East  Asia  and  Latin  America.  The  most  affected  countries 
exhibiting emigration rates above 40 percent are Grenada, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Ireland, 
Liberia, Jamaica and Fiji. Using the same dataset, Figure 2c reveals that the medical brain 
drain rates have increased dramatically in many African countries but also in Lebanon, Cuba, 
Cyprus, or the Philippines. 
 
 
3. Africa’s medical brain drain 
As explained above, Clemens and Peterson (2006) and Docquier and Bhargava (2006) use 
different definitions of the medical brain drain, by country of birth (for the former) and by 
country  of training  (for the  latter). This leads to  important differences in  their respective 
estimates of the medical brain drain, as we have seen. Interestingly, the main culprit for such 
differences  is  Africa.  Indeed,  due  to  absence  of  local  medical  schools,  eleven  African 
countries have no domestically trained physician emigrants living abroad while they exhibit 
medical brain drain rates between 5 to 15 percent if one uses the country-of-birth criterion. 
Figures 3.a and 3.b illustrate the difference between these two definitions of physicians’ brain 
drain in the case of Africa. 
 
3.1. Determinants of the medical brain drain. 
As for general migration, it is obvious that the emigration of physicians is not an exogenous 
process. Individual-level surveys in six African countries indicate that more than half of all 
physicians  would  like  to  emigrate  to  developed  countries,  in  search  of  better  working 
conditions and more comfortable lifestyles (Awases et al., 2003). The risks associated with 
caring for HIV/AIDS patients and the possibility of children of healthcare staff contracting 
HIV as they enter adolescence may exacerbate the medical brain drain (Awases et al., 2003; 
Bhargava, 2005). 
                                                
5 Licensure requirements for foreign physicians are more stringent in France than in most other host countries.   10
Figure 2. The medical brain drain 
 
2a. Physicians per 1,000 people, year 2004 
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Figure 2. The medical brain drain (cont’d) 
 
2.b. Medical brain drain, year 2004 
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Figure 2. The medical brain drain (cont’d) 
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Using  their data set  by country of training, Bhargava and  Docquier  (2008) estimated the 
determinants  of the  African  medical  brain  drain.  Consistently  with  Awases et al.  (2003), 
countries  with  higher  physician  wages  have  lower  emigration  rates.  Net  enrolment  in 
secondary education is also a positive and significant predictor of the medical brain drain, 
with  an  estimated  short-run  elasticity  of  0.12.  This  result  is  not  surprising,  as  higher 
enrolments  in  secondary  education  entail  greater  expenditures  on  education;  physicians 
educated  in  such  environments  are  likely  to  have  better  emigration  prospects.  More 
importantly, the HIV prevalence rate is a significant predictor of the medical brain drain, with 
a short-run elasticity of 0.07 and a long-run elasticity of 0.80; this means that a doubling of 
the HIV prevalence rate implies an 80 percent increase in the medical brain drain rate in the 
long run. This is a large effect, with important policy implications. 
Using  the  same  data  set,  Moullan  (2008)  recently  analyzed  the  effect  of  bilateral  health 
assistance on the bilateral medical brain drain. The rationale is that, by increasing health 
capital and  infrastructure, health assistance can improve the working conditions of health 
professionals. His cross-section and panel analyses show that health assistance is an effective 
tool to retain doctors at home. However, elasticities are relatively low, suggesting that a huge 
amount of health assistance would be required to reduce the medical brain drain. Interestingly, 
total bilateral aid (health + non-health) seems to stimulate the medical brain drain under most 
specifications. 
 
3.2. The case for a medical brain gain 
In the spirit of the recent literature on endogenous human capital in a context of migration, we 
may  ask  whether  there  is  a  chance  for  a  net  medical  brain  gain.  Regressing  the  log  of 
domestic physicians per capita on the log of physician emigrants per capita, Clemens (2007) 
found a positive correlation of about 70 percent. Clearly, this correlation can be driven by the 
simultaneous effects of observed variables (GDP per capita, school enrolment conflicts, etc.) 
or unobserved variables. However, after controlling for observables and instrumenting the 
number of emigrants, the causal effect of emigration becomes insignificant. This analysis fails 
to detect any negative effect of health professionals’ emigration on the supply of healthcare 
staff in Africa in a cross-section analysis based on 53 observations. The author attributes this 
provocative  result to  the  positive  effect  of emigration  prospects  on enrolment in  medical 
sciences.   14
Figure 3. Africa’s medical brain drain in percent (year 2000) 
 
3.a. Africa’s medical brain drain by country of birth 
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Figure 3. Africa’s medical brain drain (cont’d) 
 
3.b. Africa’s medical brain drain by country of training 
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The absence of negative effect of emigration on domestic health worker stocks could also be 
due  to  omitted  variables  such  as  the  size  (and  quality)  of  the  medical  training  system. 
Physician emigration is instrumented with country size and linguistic links. However, data 
reveal a strong correlation between country size and both the number of medical schools (82 
percent) and the annual number of domestically-trained medical graduates (60 percent). In 
addition, the number of schools and graduates are significantly higher in English-speaking 
countries or UK former colonies. Hence, it is very likely that country size and linguistic 
linkages exert a direct impact in the domestic supply of health workers. This causal link 
obviously needs to be explored in more details in future studies. 
Two other studies examine the interactions between education and migration decisions in the 
medical sector. Although the samples are not restricted to African countries, they deliver 
interesting results for developing countries in general, and low-income countries in particular. 
The  first  study  by  Kangasniemi  et  al.  (2007)  documents  the  incentive  mechanism  in  the 
medical sector, using a survey of overseas doctors working in the United Kingdom. They 
show  that  28  percent  of  Indian  doctors  surveyed  (the  largest  group  in  their  sample) 
acknowledge  that  the  prospect  of  emigration  affected  their  education  decisions.  This 
proportion increases to 37 for doctors originating from low-income countries and 29 percent 
for those originating from middle-income countries. In addition, the same doctors subjectively 
estimate  that  the  current  proportion  of  medical  students  whom  effort  is  affected  by  the 
prospect to work abroad amounts to 36 percent for India, 46 percent for low-income countries 
and  41  percent  for  middle-income  countries.  Given  these  proportions,  it  is  impossible  to 
conclude that the incentive effect is not large enough to increase the skills-supply in origin 
countries. The key question is: would these doctors or students have opted for medical studies 
without such emigration prospects? Basically, a necessary condition for a brain gain is that the 
proportion of students reacting to emigration prospects exceeds the actual emigration rate. 
The survey suggests that this is likely to be the case for many low-income countries, including 
most African countries. In addition, doctors remit income to their home countries and many 
intend to return after completing their training in the UK, so there could be additional benefits 
via these routes. 
In the second study, Defoort (2009) regresses the change in native health professionals on past 
medical  emigration  rates.  She  took  advantage  of  the  panel  structure  of  the  Docquier-
Bhargava’s data set and worked with 5 observations per country (one observation every 3 
years). Using different methods (fixed effects vs random effects, GLS, IV, GMM), she found   17 
evidence of a positive incentive effect in low-income countries. Using simulations, she found 
an optimal medical brain drain rate of 9 percent. She concludes that only 20 African counties 
suffer from the medical brain drain while about 30 countries would actually gain (in terms of 
physicians per capita) from an increase in medical emigration rates. 
 
3.3. Impact on health. 
Since 1990, the world’s countries and leading development institutions have agreed on a set 
of “Millennium Development Goals” (MDG). The Millennium Declaration, signed in 2000, 
established 2015 as the deadline for achieving the MDG. The eight goals include specific 
health targets: (i) reducing by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five, (ii) 
reducing  by  three  quarters  the  maternal  mortality  ratio  and  achieving  universal  access  to 
reproductive health, (iii) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. Much progress has 
been made in reducing maternal deaths in developing regions, but not in the countries where 
giving birth is most risky, and many countries are still falling short of meeting the goals. 
Is the medical brain drain partly responsible for these bad records? Using the methodology 
described  above,  Clemens  (2007)  found  no  significant  causal  impact  of  the  numbers  of 
physicians and nurses abroad on child mortality, infant mortality under age one, vaccination 
rates or prevalence of acute respiratory infections in children under age five. Chauvet et al. 
(2008)  investigated  the  determinants  of  child  mortality  using  a  sample  of  98  developing 
countries from 1987 to 2004. In their benchmark full-sample regressions, remittances strongly 
improve health indicators while health aid per capita and the number of physicians per 1,000 
people have no significant impact. However, when interacted with the level of development, 
health  aid  commitments  become  significant  and  help  reducing  child  mortality  in  poorer 
countries,  while  the  number  of  physicians  per  1,000  people  has  no  significant  impact. 
Interestingly, the supply of healthcare staff does not significantly reduce infant and child 
mortality rates. However, the medical brain drain is shown to significantly deteriorate child 
health  indicators.  This  suggests  that  emigrants  could  positively  self-select  out  of  the 
physicians’  population,  with  only  the  most  talented  obtaining  a  qualification  abroad  and 
leaving. In Bhargava and Docquier (2008), the medical brain drain also appears to induce 
detrimental effects: a doubling of the medical brain drain rate is associated with a 20 percent 
increase in adult deaths from AIDS. Their study also suggests that a high HIV prevalence can 
create a vicious circle, by increasing emigration of physicians and nurses, which can in turn 
increase deaths from AIDS and the numbers of orphaned children. These findings underscore   18 
the  importance  of  retaining  physicians  in  Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  especially  as 
antiretroviral treatment becomes more widely available. 
 
4. Europe and the global competition for talent 
The  new  growth  literature  emphasizes  the  role  of  human  capital  on  growth  and 
competitiveness.  While imitation of existing  technologies  requires  individuals with  strong 
technical and professional skills developed through secondary or specialized higher education, 
innovation  is  research-based  and  requires  the  presence  of  highly-qualified  scientists  and 
researchers (Aghion and Cohen, 2004). In the race for innovation and economic leadership, 
European countries have understood that preventing an exodus of European researchers is 
crucial.  In  the  words  of  European  Research  Commissioner  Philippe  Busquin,  in  2005: 
“Failing  to  do  so  will  seriously  undermine  our  chances  of  creating  a  genuine  European 
internal market for knowledge and science, and also of meeting our objective of making the 
EU the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world”. The EU produces more 
science graduates per capita (PhDs) than the US but has fewer researchers (5.36 per 1,000 
workers against 8.66 in the US and 9.72 in Japan). The Lisbon Council of 1999 and the 
Barcelona European Council meeting of March 2002 set an official target of raising Europe's 
investment in research to 3% of GDP by 2010, implying to train and hire 700,000 additional 
researchers. As the deadline approaches, it seems almost certain Europe will not achieve such 
targets, and so far the exodus of European researchers has shown no sign of weakening. 
 
4.1. Where does Europe stand? 
Let us first compare the situation of Europe to that of other countries in terms of exchange of 
post-secondary educated migrants. For this purpose, we use the data set of Docquier, Lowell 
and Marfouk (2009). Table 3 gives a detailed picture of skilled labor exchanges between 
EU15 countries and the rest  of the  world in  2000. One can  see that by 2000, the  EU15 
exhibited a net loss of 0.120 million post-secondary educated workers in its exchanges with 
the rest of the world. This is clearly a lower bound since de DLM data set does not account 
for EU emigrants to non-OECD countries. This net deficit represented only 0.3 percent of the 
European skilled labor force, in sharp contrast with the huge gains (12.5 percent of the skilled 
labor force) in a group of countries comprising the United States, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand. In addition, the European deficit of post-secondary educated workers in exchanges   19 
with traditional immigration countries was particularly important (2.6 million individuals in 
2000); it was more or less compensated numerically by the large entry of skilled workers from 
developing countries. 
In terms of raw numbers, the relative loss of EU15 is rather low. Qualitatively, however, it is 
likely to be more important. The first reason is that graduates from developing countries are 
usually less productive than domestic graduates: for example, Dumont and Lemaître (2007) 
showed that the employment rate gap between natives and immigrants tends to increase with 
the  level  of  schooling.  The  authors  estimate  that  one-third  of  the  difference  between 
immigrants and natives is explained by the skill-schooling gap (variation in efficiency for a 
given level of schooling). This result is comforted by Coulombe and Tremblay (2009) who 
show that the average skill-schooling in Canada is equivalent to 3.2 years of schooling. The 
skill-schooling gap is country-specific and decreases with the level of development of the 
origin country. The second reason is that the European brain drain concerns top-skill workers. 
Table 4 presents estimates of the brain drain of European researchers employed in Science 
and Technology (S&T) or European PhD holders. Columns 1 and 2 give the emigration rates 
of post-secondary educated to the OECD and to  the  US. Column  3 gives the  number  of 
European  researchers  employed  in  S&T  in  the  US
6  divided  by  the  sum  of  researchers 
employed  in  the  origin  country
7  and  in  the  US.  Finally,  column  4  gives  the  number  of 
European PhD holders residing in the US
8 divided by the sum of PhD holders residing in the 
origin country
9 and in the US. 
The brain drain of graduates employed in S&T is strongly correlated with the general brain 
drain to the US and to the OECD computed by Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (coefficients of 
correlation  of  64  and  70  percent,  respectively).  However,  the  brain  drain  in  R&D  is  on 
average 5.3 times larger than the general brain drain to the US. In other words, European 
skilled emigration to the US is biased toward S&T activities. The biggest biases are observed 
in Belgium, France, the Netherland and the United Kingdom. The brain drain of European 
PhD  holders  is  less  correlated  with  the  general  brain  drain  to  the  US  (coefficients  of 
correlation of 33 and 51 percent, respectively) but is still on average 2.2 times higher than for 
all post-secondary educated workers. 
                                                
6  We  use  the  SESTAT-NSF  data  set  and  aggregate  the  numbers  of  graduates  employed  in  Research  and 
Development, graduates employed in Computers and Applications, and 50 percent of graduates employed in 
teaching. 
7 We use the OECD data set on science and technology indicators. 
8 We use the SESTAT data set. 
9 The stock of PhD holders is estimated by multiplying the flow of new PhD graduates by 12 (UNESCO).   20




  EU15 origin country:  Region of origin: 
   AUT  BEL  DEN  FIN  FRA  GER  GRE  IRE  ITA  LUX  NET  POR  SPA  SWE  UK  EU15  TIC  OECD  Others  World 
Emig. to EU15                                          
Austria (AUT  0  413  218  362  1549  24629  745  138  3436  154  1107  99  0  680  1854  35384  3131  26614  38110  103239 
Belgium (BEL)  605  0  979  923  15193  7743  1471  924  5782  639  17159  1161  23  1356  6741  60699  3955  5932  29211  99797 
Denmark (DEN)  193  164  0  763  819  4672  174  229  549  4  931  103  385  2831  2169  13986  2123  7748  15789  39646 
Finland (FIN)  58  40  125  0  200  740  52  32  138  2  142  22  33  4170  512  6266  890  1099  13268  21523 
France (FRA)  2551  26069  2318  1501  0  32281  3646  2408  23835  1125  10130  21573  2086  3596  33422  166541  23361  56472  362789  609163 
Germany (GER-  44000  5511  4917  3730  25843  0  41000  3680  44000  1403  25987  31367  10171  4427  40000  286037  49109  210641  475075  1020861 
Greece (GRE-  305  323  165  144  1238  2259  0  119  1163  11  516  35  34  276  2525  9113  3639  2913  49123  64788 
Ireland (IRE)  158  434  282  329  3101  3254  149  0  1367  19  1333  154  0  467  62946  73993  12447  2391  26890  115721 
Italy (ITA)  1341  1565  531  475  7701  9299  1608  715  0  70  1993  405  957  767  7741  35168  8562  12605  86366  142700 
Luxembourg (LUX)  138  4810  623  345  4198  2383  409  125  598  0  866  602  8  447  1268  16820  589  832  3579  21819 
Netherland (NET)  3444  24549  1060  668  5456  97718  2105  1196  6983  190  0  2629  1176  916  13397  161488  9041  20254  203206  393989 
Portugal (POR)  135  481  132  137  1642  2167  32  156  525  23  887  0  4  198  2291  8810  916  852  16917  27495 
Spain (SPA)  920  4520  1280  900  27140  22440  220  860  5680  160  0  2880  20  1540  18060  86620  9500  19900  178020  294040 
Sweden (SWE)  1290  400  6680  31330  2100  8850  1780  410  1350  0  1630  430  470  0  5020  61740  7190  31850  95090  195870 
United Kingdom (UK)  4966  4926  5232  3075  24454  64573  6609  104112  34353  162  10713  10243  18445  5785  0  297647  163361  58219  714314  1233540 
Total EU15  60103  74205  24542  44683  120634  283009  59999  115105  129759  3963  73393  71704  33813  27456  197946  1320312  297815  458321  2307746  4384193 
Share in total emigr.  0.46  0.64  0.36  0.62  0.39  0.30  0.37  0.51  0.33  0.62  0.29  0.49  0.29  0.34  0.13  0.29  0.24  0.16  0.20  0.22 
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Table 3. Exchanges of post-secondary educated workers between EU15 and other OECD countries  (2/2) 
 
  EU15 origin countries:  Region of origin 
   AUT  BEL  DEN  FIN  FRA  GER  GRE  IRE  ITA  LUX  NET  POR  SPA  SWE  UK  EU15  TIC  OECD  Others  World 
Emigration to TIC                                          
Australia  6999  2405  3720  2724  9379  38440  18947  22801  28401  64  30259  2642  30913  3517  381348  582559  176295  96507  785418  1640779 
Canada  14535  11395  10950  7685  46830  111710  19315  14990  80600  250  65655  31845  32010  4625  365420  817815  162430  225890  1518095  2724230 
New-Zeland  495  210  576  165  759  4056  180  2481  375  12  8451  54  2931  366  85236  106347  23739  8091  79782  217959 
US  35509  21806  19990  13601  93769  387067  56518  71697  132333  1647  63054  37536  15394  31520  418794  1400236  489072  1917039  6603668  10410014 
Total TIC  57538  35816  35236  24175  150737  541273  94960  111969  241709  1973  167419  72077  81248  40028  1250798  2906957  851536  2247527  8986963  14992982 
Share in total emigr.  0.44  0.31  0.52  0.33  0.49  0.58  0.59  0.49  0.61  0.31  0.66  0.49  0.69  0.50  0.85  0.65  0.69  0.78  0.77  0.74 
Emigration to OECD     
Total EU15+TIC  117641 110021  59778  68858  271371  824282  154959  227074  371468  5936  240812  143781  115060  67484  1448744  4227268  1149350  2705848  11294709  19377175 
Rest of OECD  12507  7027  8114  3738  39383  112241  6712  1070  23765  485  13922  1986  2496  13073  29733  276253  92956  167621  336036  872866 
Total OECD  130148 117048  67892  72596  310754  936523  161670  228144  395233 6421  254734  145767  117557  80557  1478477  4503521  1242306  2873469  11630745  20250041 
Net emigration                                          
EU15  24719  13506  10556  38417  -45907  -3028  50886  41112  94591  -12857  -88095  62894  -52807  -34284  -99701  0  -2609142  182068  2307746   -  
TIC  54407  31861  33113  23285  127376  492164  91321  99522  233147  1384  158377  71161  71748  32838  1087437  2609142  0  2154571  8986963   -  
Rest of OECD  -14107  1095  366  2639  -17089  -98400  3799  -1321  11160  -346  -6332  1134  -17404  -18777  -28486  -182068  -2154571  0  336036   -  
Other countries  -38110  -29211  -15789  -13268  -362789  -475075  -49123  -26890  -86366  -3579  -203206  -16917  -178020  -95090  -714314  -2307746  -8986963  -336036  0   -  
Total  26909  17251  28246  51073  -298409  -84339  96882  112423  252532  -15398  -139255  118272  -176483  -115313  244936  119328  -13750676  2000603  11630745   -  
 % skilled labor force  3,2  0,9  3,5  5,4  -3,4  -0,5  8,3  25,0  6,8  -18,6  -5,7  19,0  -58,9  -6,7  3,4  0,3  -12,5  4,5  7,6   -  
 
Legend : TIC = Traditional immigration countries (US, Australia, Canada, New-Zeland) 
Source : Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2007) 
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Table 4. Brain drain of European scientists to the US in percent 





in S&T (US) 
PhD 
holders (US) 
Austria   3.7  13.5  12.6  4.2 
Belgium   1.0  5.5  12.9  2.3 
Denmark   2.3  7.8  9.3  4.8 
Finland   1.3  7.2  1.9  1.4 
France   1.0  3.4  7.6  2.8 
Germany  2.4  5.7  18.0  2.7 
Greece   4.2  12.1  28.4  8.5 
Ireland   10.6  33.7  33.0  16.0 
Italy   3.2  9.6  17.0  2.6 
Luxembourg   1.8  7.2  4.5   -  
Netherlands   2.3  9.5  15.6  3.1 
Portugal   4.9  18.9  11.4  0.7 
Spain   1.1  4.2  -  1.9 
Sweden   1.8  4.5  6.7  1.6 
United Kingdom  4.8  17.1  29.0  6.2 
Bulgaria   1.3  9.6   -   11.7 
Cyprus   4.4  34.2  52.6  49.2 
Czech Republic  2.7  8.5  12.5  3.9 
Estonia   2.5  9.9  21.0  11.2 
Hungary   4.7  12.8  24.9  12.5 
Latvia   4.7  8.5  45.3  8.7 
Lithuania   3.2  8.3  24.3  5.6 
Malta   7.3  58.3  55.7  10.1 
Poland   5.7  14.2  -  5.7 
Romania   4.1  11.2  34.4  4.8 
Slovakia  3.6  14.3  10.9  3.0 
Slovenia   1.8  10.9  4.3  2.9 
Australia   0.8  2.7  5.8  2.1 
Canada   3.9  4.7  37.1  15.7 
Japan   0.9  1.2  4.9  1.8 
China   2.1  3.8  14.9  22.8 
Sources: DLM (2009), SESTAT-NSF, UNESCO, OECD 
 
4.2. EU’s brain drain and R&D policy. 
The figures above clearly reveal that Europe is suffering from a large emigration of scientists 
and top-skill workers. Comparing US census data for 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2006, Tritah 
(2008)  shows  that  Europeans  emigrants  are  increasingly  drained  from  the  top  of  the 
distribution  of  skills  and  ladder  of  occupations  that  matter  the  most  for  the  knowledge 
economy (engineers, researchers and university instructors). Is there any positive feedback   23 
effect associated  with the European  brain  drain? Clearly, given the development level  of 
Europe, we should not expect strong incentive effects and huge amount of remittances to be 
observed. Return migration is more likely to play a role. Nevertheless, Tritah’s estimates 
suggests that returns rate in all large European countries have decreased during the 1990s 
compared to the 1980s, except for the UK where it has remained stable at below 40%. 
The  key  question  is  then:  does  the  emigration  of  European  scientists’  threaten  R&D 
performances, or do low R&D investments stimulate the brain drain? The OECD database on 
Main Science and Technology Indicators reveals that European investments in “knowledge” 
(sum of R&D expenditures, investments in software, higher-education spending) represents 
3.8  percent  of  GDP, against  5  percent  in  Japan  and  6.6  percent in  the  United  States.  In 
particular, while the 2000 Lisbon Council aimed at increasing European R&D spending from 
1.8 percent in the late 1990s to 3 percent of GDP in 2010, this ratio has hardly increased and 
remains below 2% in 2006 a majority of countries; only Sweden (already at more than 3% in 
1995) and Finland meet the objective. Figures 4.a and 4.b compare the number of researchers 
per 1,000 jobs in 1995 with the growth rate of this variable between 1995 and 2005. The data 
are taken from the OECD data base on Science and Technology indicators (October 2007). A 
negative slope of the regression line can be interpreted as a sign of convergence between 
countries. The strong convergence observed on Figure 4.a is driven by the cases of middle-
income and emerging countries. On Figure 4.b, we restrict the sample to advanced countries 
(EU, Japan, US). The slope becomes insignificant and the R-squared is close to zero. This 
indicates that the number of researchers per 1,000 jobs remains much lower in Europe than in 
Japan or the US, which no signs of convergence since the mid-1990s.   24 
Figure 4. Numbers and growth rate of researchers per 1,000 jobs (1995-2005) 
4.a. Number of researchers per 1,000 jobs (extended OECD) 
 
4.b. Number of researchers per 1,000 jobs (EU, Japan and US) 
   25 
Looking  at  correlations  between  R&D  spending  and  growth,  Tritah  (2008)  shows  that 
“countries that have increased their R&D spending more in proportion to their GDP are also 
those whose expatriation of scientists and engineers to the United States has increased the 
least”. Based on an estimated supply and demand framework, he finds the brain-drain to be a 
symptom of the lack of demand for skilled labor in Europe that has followed the rise in skilled 
labor  supply  in  the  1990s.  His  analysis  strongly  supports  the  idea  that  expatriation  of 
scientists and engineers is due, at least to some extent, to the lack of resources dedicated to 
research  in  their  countries.  Other  evidence  corroborates  this  result.  In  particular,  low 
investments in knowledge also translate into low wages for scientists, unstable or unattractive 
jobs, competition with non PhD graduates, excess load of administrative tasks, etc., which are 
often cited as major push factors in opinion surveys among European researchers.
10 
 
4.3. On European Blue cards. 
Most European governments have eased restrictions on entry for skilled workers, and many 
are going much further, not just “letting them in” but rather engaging in what has been termed 
an international competition to attract talent: “Germany has made it easier for skilled workers 
to get visas. Britain has offered more work permits for skilled migrants. France has introduced 
a “scientist visa”. Many countries are making it easier for foreign students to stay on after 
graduating  [...].  Ireland's  government  works  hard  to  recruit  overseas  talent  [...].  Many 
countries regard universities as ideal talent-catching machines, not only because they select 
students on the basis of ability but also because those students bring all sorts of other benefits, 
from spending money to providing cheap research labor. France is aiming to push up its 
proportion of foreign students from about 7% now to 20% over time. Germany is trying to 
create a Teutonic Ivy League and wants to “internationalize studies in Germany”. The global 
war for talent is likely to intensify. Most developed countries are already struggling to find 
enough  doctors  and  teachers,  and  are  wondering  how  they  will  manage  when  the  baby-
boomer generation retires.”
11 
Many practical policy recommendations have been proposed by the European Commission to 
curb or invert the EU scientists’ brain drain. The most recent proposal, officially endorsed by 
the EU in 2008, is to create by 2010 a European Blue Card meant to attract highly-qualified 
workers. The blue card would grant such workers and their families with rights to work and 
                                                
10 See, e.g., Le Monde (Blog), April 27, 2009: “L’exode des chercheurs européens et ses périls”. 
11 The Economist, “Opening the doors”, October 5, 2006.   26 
live in the EU countries for 3 to 5 years. More precisely, the Blue Card would allow an 
immigrant to work in one EU country. After the first 18 months, the worker could then move 
to another country, but would still have to apply for a new Blue Card within a month of 
arrival. This is far from the initial proposal as first proposed by Jakob Von Weizsäcker from 
the Bruegel Institute in 2006 (Von Weizsäcker, 2006, 2008). In its current format, the Blue 
Card can help attenuate labor shortages for certain professions, however it is unlikely it can 
help Europe compensate its deficit in science and technology. Given what we know on the 
determinants of skilled immigrants destination choices (see our section 2.2 above), the blue 
card proposal appears too uncertain (with uncertainty regarding mainly chances of renewal 
and transferability across EU countries) and not generous enough to significantly change the 
attractiveness of the European labor market for scientists and talented workers. 
 
5. The Indian Diaspora and the rise of India’s IT sector 
The Indian-born population in the US increased twofold (from one half to one million) over 
the course of the 1990s, with half of this increase being due to the arrival of skilled (i.e., 
tertiary educated) workers. The database of Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009) reveals 
that there were more than one million skilled Indian emigrants worldwide in 2000, placing 
India second just to the Philippines among developing countries for the number of skilled 
emigrants living in the OECD area, and almost on par with the Philippines after excluding 
people arrived before age 22, as shown in Beine et al. (2007). As is well known, Indians also 
represent the bulk of H1-B visas holders in the US (see Table 5), a visa category aimed at 
skilled professionals in sectors with occupational shortages (in practice, software engineers 
and programmers). 
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Table 5: Number of H1B visas delivered to Indian immigrants, 1998-2008
12 
  India as country of    Percentage of total 
Year  Citizenship  Residence  Total  Citizenship  Residence 
2008  154 726  78 913  409 619  37,77  19,26 
2007  157 613  81 584  461 730  34,14  17,67 
2006  125 717  67 292  431 853  29,11  15,58 
2005  102 382  55 873  407 418  25,13  13,71 
2004  83 536    387 147  21,58   
2003  75 964    360 498  21,07   
2002  81 091    370 490  21,89   
2001  104 543    384 191  27,21   
2000  102 453    355 605  28,81   
1999  85 012    302 326  28,12   
1998  62 544    240 947  25,96   




Given  its  high  ranking  and  standing  as  an  exporter  of  skilled  professionals  and  talented 
individuals, India has been the subject of a large amount of brain drain oriented research. The 
presence of highly educated Indians among the business, scientific and academic elites of 
England, the US, and other Western countries, is impressive and has long been both a matter 
of national pride and of persistent concern. Echoing this ambivalence, Desai et al. (2009) 
evaluated the fiscal cost of the brain drain for India at 0.5 percent of Indian GDP or 2.5 
percent of total Indian fiscal revenues, a “conservative” estimate in their view. However, their 
computations  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  all  Indian  engineers  abroad  would  have 
worked as engineers in India, and would have engaged in engineering studies in the first 
place, which is disputable. While it is clear that many of them would not have worked as 
engineers if it was not for the possibility of migration, the no-migration counterfactual is not 
clear. If one assumes that in alternative occupations their wages would have been lower, then 
Desai et al. (2009) fiscal loss estimates could instead be seen as an upper bound. In fact, many 
of them end up in managerial jobs (for example, 52 percent of the graduates of IIT-Bombay 
of 2005-6 ended up in consulting and finance), which are much higher paying occupations in 
India than engineering, and accounting for this would indeed push the fiscal loss estimates 
upwards. Perhaps more importantly, if the loss is not that of engineers per se but a selection 
                                                
12 Courtesy of Devesh Kapur.   28 
bias  in  which  entrepreneurial  talent  is  lost,
13  then  the  tax  losses  are  on  corporate  and 
VAT/sales taxes and not income taxes on which Desai et al. (2009) focused on. 
In any event, the last years have seen a gradual reversal in media and public attitudes in India, 
and it is now common to celebrate the contribution of the Indian diaspora to the country’s 
industrial  and  economic  success.  India  has  already  been  frequently  cited  in  the  recent 
literature  to  exemplify  the  potential  for  a  diaspora  to  foster  technology  and  knowledge 
diffusion (Kerr, 2008, Agrawal et al., 2008) or the contribution of return migration to the 
home economy (Agrawal et al., 2008, Saxeenian, 2006). In what follows we will focus on the 
role of the Indian diaspora, especially that established in the Silicon Valley, in the rise of the 
Indian IT sector in India. We will base our account mainly on the works of Saxenian (1999, 
2002), Arora and Gambardella (2005), Kapur and McHale (2005), Commander et al. (2008), 
and Kapur (2009, Chapter 4). 
The first study to point to the potential role of the Indian diaspora in the rise of the software 
industry in India is the well known work of Saxenian (1999), who noted the large implication 
of Indian (and Chinese) entrepreneurs in the Silicon Valley: Indians were shown to run 9 
percent of Silicon Valley start-ups from the period 1995 to 1998, with a majority of these 
start-ups (nearly 70 percent) in the software sector. A more recent survey (Wadhwa et al., 
2007)  shows  the  last  decade  has  been  even  more  impressive  in  terms  of  Indian-born 
entrepreneurs’ share in the US high-tech sector: it shows that out of an estimated 7,300 U.S. 
tech  start-ups  founded  by  immigrants  between  1995  and  2005,  26  percent  have  Indian 
founders, CEOs, presidents or head researchers—more people than from the four next biggest 
sources (United Kingdom, China, Taiwan and Japan) combined. Indian immigrants outpaced 
their Chinese counterparts as founders of engineering and technology companies in Silicon 
Valley, with Indians being key founders of 15.5 percent of all Silicon Valley startups, mainly 
in  the  fields  of  software  (for  46  percent  of  them)  and  innovation/manufacturing-related 
services (44 percent). 
Saxenian (2002) then proceeded to explore not just the potential but the actual business links 
with India. In her survey of Indian (and Chinese) members of professional associations in the 
Silicon Valley, she shows that these links are indeed important: for instance, 77 percent of the 
respondents had one or more friends who returned to India to start a company, 52 percent 
used to travel to India for business purposes on a regular basis (at least once a year), 27 
percent reported regularly exchanging information on jobs/business opportunities with those 
                                                
13 As evidenced for example by Saxenian (2006).   29 
back home, 33 percent reported regular exchanges of information on technology. In addition, 
46 percent had been a contact for domestic Indian businesses, and 23 percent claimed to have 
invested their own money into Indian start-ups. Last but not least, when asked about the 
possibility of return migration, 45 percent reported returning as somewhat or quite likely. 
Such results must be taken with caution as they are based on a non-representative sample (due 
to self-selection into the professional associations surveyed and to the choice to respond to the 
survey).
14 As Kapur and McHale (2005) note, “these figures contradict what is known about 
the activities of Indian diaspora from other sources, so that the survey’s results need to be 
treated with some caution. One problem is that the investment data is silent on the magnitude 
of investments. Foreign direct investment from the Indian diaspora is less than 5 percent of its 
Chinese  counterparts—even  though  the  propensity  to  invest  is  comparable  for  the  two 
diasporas in Saxenian’s survey. Similarly, the finding that 45% would consider returning is 
belied by reality. While aggregate data on return migration is unavailable, segment specific 
data such as NSF longitudinal data on PhD students suggests a number closer to 5 percent.” 
Still,  Saxenian’s  results  are  suggestive  of  strong  connections  between  the  Silicon  Valley 
resident Indians and those in India. And indeed, the role of the Indian diaspora has been 
singled out as a primary factor of India’s emergence on the global IT scene. As Kapur (2002) 
put it, “One of the puzzles about the explosive growth of India’s IT sector is how and why 
India has emerged as a global leader in a leading edge industry when, despite strenuous (and, 
in retrospect, misguided) policies, it failed to achieve such leadership in any other technology 
intensive sector. The issue is even more puzzling if one keeps in mind that conventional 
indicators  of  IT  penetration,  such  as  personal  computers  (PCs)  per  thousand  population, 
internet  subscribers,  telephone connections,  scientists  and engineers  per  million,  all  make 
India look decidedly mediocre”. To solve this puzzle, Kapur (2002, 2009) first reviewed what 
he presents as proximate causes of the Indian IT sector success, namely, the lack of State 
intervention and the flexibility of the labor market in the IT sector, and then turns to what he 
sees as the root causes. Chief among them is… the brain drain, whose beneficial effects, he 
argues, have been multifaceted. Paraphrasing Kapur’s account and linking his analysis to the 
general arguments put forward in the recent literature on the effects of emigration on home 
countries, the following channels may be emphasized: 
•  A first windfall from India’s brain drain is that it has provided prospective investors 
with  information  on  the  quality  of  the  Indian  labor  force  and  created  virtuous 
                                                
14 The overall response rate was 21 percent.   30 
reputational spillovers, sparking demands for Indian IT specialists in countries without 
previous Indian migration experience (e.g., Germany, Japan) as well as international 
demand for IT services exported from India.
15 This is very much in line with the 
general argument about an information and transaction cost channel, especially with 
the argument that migrant workers, skilled or unskilled, can convey information and 
reduce  transaction  costs  through  their  sheer  presence  in  the  host  countries  labor 
markets. Evidence of  such information and transaction  cost effects contributing  to 
foster FDI from host to home countries can be found in studies using bileral (Kugler 
and Rapoport, 2007, Javorcik et al., 2006, Buch et al., 2006) as well as aggregate 
(Docquier and Lodigiani, 2009) data. 
•  Second,  the  overseas  Indian  presence  has  helped  in  the  diffusion  of  knowledge 
through a variety of mechanisms: substantial skill upgrades for those who worked in 
the US, with diffusion to India through return migration and brain circulation. This is a 
a perfect illustration of another channel put forward in the recent brain drain literature, 
namely,  the  knowledge  and  technology  diffusion  channel,  as  well  as  additional 
evidence of the brain circulation (or return migration with additional skills and human 
capital). As such, this confirms recent studies using patent citation data to measure the 
international diffusion of knowledge and innovation through diaspora networks (Kerr, 
2008, Agrawal et al., 2008). 
•  Third, the diaspora has been an effective partner in setting up sectoral institutions and 
networks who successfully lobbied the Indian government to change the regulatory 
framework for venture capital in India. While this example is restricted to a particular 
sector, it is not difficult to imagine that once such lobbying organizations are in place, 
with their set-up costs already incurred, they can also be activated towards achieving 
broader political and institutional reforms. This exemplifies the type of institutional 
reform  towards  better  regulations  and  more  effective  economic  and  political 
institutions  emphasize  in  the  recent  brain  drain  literature  in  the  effects  of  skilled 
emigration and foreign students on home countries institutions and governance (Li and 
McHale, 2006, Docquier et al., 2009, Spilimbergo, 2009). 
•  And fourth, instead of developing a protectionist attitude by trying to keep engineers 
and IT specialists at home, the Indian industry has realized the potential gains from 
foreign experience and supported an increase in the number of H1-B visas for Indian 
                                                
15 This echoes Banerjee and Duflo’s (2000) evidence that reputation affects the form of contracts that firms 
outsourcing customized software enter into with Indian software firms.   31 
professionals in the US. The reason lies in changes in the market structure of the 
global IT industry, itself a lagged effect of previous brain drain. Ten of the largest 
twenty-five companies hiring foreign nationals with H-1B visas are IT firms based in 
India or U.S.-based IT firms run by Indian nationals. This may clearly be interpreted 
along  the lines  suggested in  our introduction about the endogenous  human capital 
formation in a context of migration, often referred to as the brain drain v. brain gain 
debate, and further adds to the recent evidence (e.g., Beine et al., 2008) on endogenous 
human  capital  formation  and  return  migration  as  potential  mechanisms  possibility 
leading to a beneficial brain drain (or net brain gain). 
 
Kapur’s account demonstrates the crucial role played by the Indian diaspora at the onset of 
the IT revolution which took place in the 1990s as well as in the later phases and goes beyond 
the general effects on knowledge diffusion and technology diffusion emphasized for example 
in the papers by Kerr (2008) and Agrawal et al. (2008). This assessment is confirmed by other 
surveys  and  analyses.  For  example,  a  recent  comprehensive  survey  of  India’s  software 
industry showed that 30 to 40% of the higher-level employees have relevant work experience 
in a developed country (Commander et al., 2008). Similarly, Nanda and Khanna (2009) used a 
survey sent to all the CEOs of Indian software firms to study the role of diaspora links and 
found  that  entrepreneurs  who  live  in  hubs,  where  the  local  networking  environment  is 
stronger,  rely  on  local  networks  and  do  not  necessarily  gain  significantly  from  diaspora 
networks.  More  specifically,  for  those  entrepreneurs  based  in  smaller  cities  with  weaker 
networking  and  financing  environments,  having  a  personal  experience  abroad  allows  for 
gaining  access  to  business  and  financial  opportunities  through  diaspora  networks.  They 
conclude that brain circulation is crucial as such networks, it is argued, are successful not just 
because of the expatriates who live abroad, but because some of the expatriates have returned 
back home and know how to effectively tap into the diaspora. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Most of the recent literature on the effects of the brain drain on source countries consists of 
theoretical  papers  and  cross-country  empirical  studies.  In  this  paper  we  complement  the 
literature through three case studies on very different regional and professional contexts: the 
African medical brain drain, the exodus of European researchers to the United States, and the 
contribution of the Indian diaspora to the rise of the IT sector in India. While the three case   32 
studies concern the very upper tail of the skill and education distribution, their effects of 
source  countries  are  contrasted:  clearly  negative  in  the  case  of  the  exodus  of  European 
researchers, clearly positive in the case of the Indian diaspora’s contribution to putting India 
on the IT global map, and mixed in the case of the medical brain drain out of Africa. 
These contrasted experiences also illustrate how difficult it is to capture the effect of skilled 
emigration  on  source  countries  using  uniform  approaches  leading  to  uniform  policy 
recommendations. The recent brain drain literature shows that the brain drain has a potentially 
strong incidence on between-country inequality. In other words, there are winners and losers, 
and the brain drain may in some cases contribute to speed up the pace of convergence for 
some countries while contributing to increased divergence in the case of other countries.
16 
The case studies presented in this paper complement and strengthen this view in that they 
show similar patterns for regions and/or professions. A straightforward implication of the 
above analysis is that curbing skilled emigration maybe a sound policy objective in the case 
of Europe (assuming it does so by becoming more "talent friendly") but would clearly be 
counterproductive  in  the  case  of  India.  Regarding  specific  professions,  the  main  policy 
discussions so far have focused on proposals to create blacklists of high-risk occupations 
and/or origin countries (e.g., physicians and nurses originating from high medical brain drain 
countries with less than 0.5 healthcare professionals per 1,000 people). Our analysis shows 
that  such  proposals,  which  primarily  target  the  African  medical  brain  drain  (see  e.g., 
Beecham, 2002), should also be reevaluated in the light of the complex relationships between 
the medical brain drain, the endogenous formation of medical human capital, and the health 
infrastructure and general environment in Africa. 
                                                
16 See, e.g., Beine et al. (2008), Mountford and Rapoport (2007), and, for a survey, Docquier and Rapoport 
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